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1962/11/29

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EXCERPT

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FAIM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Appointment with You on November 29

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on November 29 at 4:30 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Mikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin and by his interpreter, Mr. Vinogradov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson, and an interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Mikoyan. (Attachment 1)

We agree with Mr. McCloy's suggestion that you may wish to make the following points clear on Cuba.

You may wish to make the following points regarding the Sino-Indian dispute. A position paper is attached (Attachment 4).

a. The United States is assisting India to meet its defense requirements at the specific request of the Government of India.

b. United States assistance is designed to permit India to maintain its territorial integrity. It, therefore, does not constitute a threat to Communist China.

c. The United States would like to see peace restored but not on terms imposed by forces by Communist China.

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We do not believe it desirable for you to raise the subject of Berlin. Should Mikoyan raise it, you may wish to discuss the problem along the lines of the instruction sent Ambassador Kohler for his talk with Semenov (copy attached, attachment 5).

Regarding Laos, you may wish to remind Mikoyan that in your talks with Khrushchev in Vienna and in subsequent talks between Harriman and Pushkin in Geneva, the Soviet Union committed itself to obtain two things which are of vital interest to the United States: the cessation of Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and the withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos. The final international agreement embodying these understandings was signed on July 23 of this year. Our information is clear that neither of the two promises has been fulfilled.

We are also particularly concerned over the recent unwarranted attack by the Pathet Lao on an Air America plane attempting to deliver rice to the Plaine des Jarres. This attack, which resulted in the death of both the pilot and co-pilot, is a direct challenge to the authority of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma who requested the flight.

The United States engagement in Southeast Asia is most serious and, consequently, fulfillment of Soviet pledges there is of first importance. A position paper is attached (attachment 6).

Regarding a nuclear test ban, you may wish to point out that it is imperative that the nuclear powers reach early agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. We are now ready to conclude an agreement banning tests in outer space, the atmosphere and underwater without prejudice to the continuing effort to reach agreement on banning underground tests. It is our firm view that agreement on the banning of underground tests should involve the principle of on-site inspection.

In connection with these steps, we would be interested in learning what possibilities the Soviet Government envisages of inducing Communist China to adhere to whatever nuclear test ban may be agreed on.

Regarding measures to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation, you may wish to note that Ambassador Dean has mentioned to the Soviet delegation in Geneva that there appear to be certain measures designed to reduce the risk of war concerning which a substantial amount of similarity already exists between our two countries. We have in mind such measures as (1) the establishment of improved communications between your side and ours, (2) advance notification regarding major military movements and (3) the exchange of military missions between our states, or groups of states, respectively. We are interested in exploring the prospects of agreement on these or similar measures designed to achieve

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the same end. We have heard that the USSR may again be interested in observation posts. We wonder if the Soviet Government has any further views on this matter. You might wish to state that if the Soviet Government were interested in proceeding with an arrangement for mutual exchange of observation posts apart from stage one of a disarmament agreement we would be glad to discuss such a plan.

If the Soviet Government agrees, we would like to give joint notification to the Acting Secretary General of the UN in the near future concerning the program for US-Soviet cooperation in outer space which was worked out by Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov. If such notification is agreeable to the Soviet side, we would anticipate moving shortly thereafter to practical steps for implementing the program. A position paper is attached (attachment 7).

There are no strictly bilateral issues which merit being raised by you in this conversation. However it is possible that Mikoyan may raise the question of US-USSR Civil Air Agreement which was initialised but not signed in August 1961. A background memorandum on the subject is attached (attachment 8). Should Mikoyan urge that the agreement be signed now, you may wish to reply that after a satisfactory Cuban settlement has been reached and if progress can be made in one or two other fields, then the time may be ripe to sign the agreement.

Mikoyan may also raise the question of increased trade between the United States and the USSR. You may wish to reply that given the current state of our relations, it is understandable that American businessmen are reluctant to enter into extensive business relations with the USSR. An improvement in the political climate would probably lead to increased trade between our two countries.

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Biographic sketch of A. I. Mikoyan.
2. Cuba - United States Relations.
3. Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba.
4. Sino Indian Border Conflict.
5. Copy of telegram to Moscow regarding Kohler talk with Semenov.
6. Laos.
7. Background of US-USSR Outer Space Cooperation.
8. US-Soviet Bilateral Air Agreement.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF  
ANASTAS IVANOVICH MIKOYAN

A. I. Mikoyan, a senior member of the Presidium of the Communist Party's Central Committee, has been an influential figure in the Soviet Union for many years. One of the few remaining old Bolsheviks in a position of authority, he has successfully threaded his way through almost five decades of abrupt political change. Mikoyan has served on the top policy making organ of the Central Committee continuously since 1926. In the Soviet Government he was named First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1953 after serving 18 years as Deputy Chairman while holding various Ministerial posts. Over these years Mikoyan has gained a considerable reputation as a shrewd, hard-hitting, and skillful negotiator.

Mikoyan was born in 1895 in Armenia. He was graduated from the Armenian Theological Academy in Tiflis but chose a political career, joining the Bolshevik Party in 1915. During the revolution and civil war, he allegedly organized workers and fought British occupation forces in the Caucasus. After holding a number of Party posts and being elected a Central Committee member in 1923, he was called to Moscow in 1926, where he was named candidate member of the Politburo and Commissar of Internal and Foreign Trade. During the 1930's he served as Commissar of Procurement and of the Food Industry. In 1936, he toured the United States to study food production methods, a trip to which Mikoyan attributes the introduction of ice cream and breakfast food into the Soviet Union. Made Commissar of Foreign Trade in 1938, Mikoyan remained in that post with certain interruptions until the mid-1950's.

During World War II Mikoyan served on the powerful State Defense Committee, his first responsibility being the procurement of supplies for the Soviet army. As a member of a special Council for Evacuation within the Council of Peoples Commissars he helped plan the removal of industrial equipment and population from those areas in the path of the German advance.

Since the death of Stalin in 1953, Mikoyan has emerged as a top Party spokesman on economic and political affairs, frequently traveling abroad to negotiate questions of key importance to Soviet policy. In 1954 and 1955 he accompanied Khrushchev and Bulganin to Communist China and Yugoslavia. In early 1956 he made an extensive tour of the Middle and Far East to further Soviet trade objectives. During the Hungarian Revolution in late 1956 Mikoyan went to Budapest with Party Presidium member M. A. Suslov and General I. A. Serov to suppress the rebellion and restore Soviet control. He visited Austria in April 1957 and in August accompanied a delegation headed by Khrushchev to East Germany. In 1958 he traveled to West Germany to negotiate economic and trade agreements, as well as a consular treaty. At the end of that year he headed a Party delegation to Poland. More recently his missions abroad have included trips to the United States (January 1959), Mexico (1959), Cuba and Norway (1960), Iraq (1960), Indonesia (1962), Japan (1962) and West Africa.

[Guinea]

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(Guinea, Ghana and Mali - 1962).

Mikoyan has weathered many storms during his long career. He has been a consistent supporter of Khrushchev in the latter's attacks on Stalin and in the purge of the so-called anti-Party group. At the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956 he made the strongest attack against the late Soviet dictator that was contained in any Congress speech published by the Soviet press.

Mikoyan has a family of four children and several grandchildren. His wife, Ashkhan Lazarevna, died during the period of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba after a long illness. His brother, Artem, is a well-known Soviet aircraft designer.

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Attachment 52

Cuba-United States Relations

Anticipated Soviet Position

The Cuban Government, with the support of the Cuban people who are imbued with revolutionary zeal, is engaged in restructuring Cuban society along Marxist-Leninist lines and the USSR intends to continue its support of these Cuban efforts. These Cuban activities do not present a threat to the United States. Why does not the United States adjust to the presence of an eventual Marxist-Leninist state near its borders, just as the USSR has learned to live with capitalist states on its borders, and leave Cuba in peace?

U.S. Position

Cuba is a hemispheric, not a United States problem. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS states have unanimously declared that the presence in the Western Hemisphere of a Marxist-Leninist state and its ties to extra-continental powers is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the inter-American system. In their communique of October 5, 1962, the Foreign Ministers characterized as a most urgent problem "Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the Hemisphere." The continued presence in Cuba of Soviet troops constitutes one of the main bases for such hemispheric concern.

The United States has repeatedly declared that it does not seek to impose its system upon the Cuban people; rather, we believe the Cuban people should have the opportunity to decide for themselves, through truly free elections, the system they wish.

Through its demonstrated unwillingness to live at peace with its neighbors, Cuba is the source of tension in the Hemisphere. Cuban intervention in the internal affairs of nations in the Hemisphere can not be tolerated indefinitely. Venezuela is a case in point. The Government of President Betancourt, a former communist, has made significant advances for the benefit of the Venezuelan people; yet the Castro Government has consistently intervened in Venezuelan affairs.

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Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba

The President may wish to elicit Mikoyan's assessment of the degree of Chinese communist influence in Cuba. Our assessment is that despite the latent Cuban sympathies for the militant Chinese line, Chinese influence in Cuba is not substantial, primarily because of Cuba's heavy economic dependence upon the USSR (for a recent analysis of Cuban-Chinese relations, please see attached report). J 6/16/65

Specifically, Mikoyan's reaction to the following would be interesting:

1. Reports emanating from Warsaw allege that some of the anti-aircraft (SA-2) missile sites are manned by Chinese Communists;
2. Reports from Cuban refugees allege that there are substantial numbers of Chinese communist troops in Cuba;
3. Our intelligence indicates that the Chinese are shipping rice and other foodstuffs to Cuba despite the serious shortages of food in China.

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Verbatim copy of telegram to Moscow

Ref: Moscow's 1339.

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REF ID: A65102  
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Attachment #4.

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Sino Indian Border Conflict

We believe that the President should make clear to Mr. Mikoyan that the change in the application of India's nonalignment policy, under which it now receives Western military assistance, has come about entirely as the result of India's own initiative in response to Chinese Communist aggression. Further, it should be emphasized that the United States is aiding India to meet this attack on its territorial integrity and that United States aid, therefore, does not constitute a threat to China itself.

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Attachment #6.

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Laos

On Tuesday, November 27, what is believed to have been 37mm anti-aircraft fire from Pathet Lao batteries forced an Air America C-123 to crash land near the Plaine des Jarres airport. Both the pilot and co-pilot were killed. A third member of the crew was injured and was evacuated to Vientiane. The plane, prior to being shot down, had already been cleared for landing and was attempting at the request of Souvanna Phouma to make a routine rice delivery to his forces at the Plaine des Jarres.

On November 23 Pathet Lao General Singkapo threatened that the Pathet Lao would "energetically adopt appropriate measures to deal with future violations by planes of any country or party of the airspace of the forces' liberated areas." We are, therefore, led to believe that this was a premeditated act on the part of the Pathet Lao. These supply flights were requested by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and none of the supplies involved were of a military nature. The United States Government has indicated that these flights would be open to inspection by the Lao authorities and/or the International Control Commission.

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Background of US-USSR Outer Space Cooperation

On February 21, Chairman Khrushchev offered congratulations on the Glenn flight and suggested that the US and the USSR get together on outer space programs. President Kennedy responded affirmatively on February 22 and on March 7 made concrete proposals to get such a program underway. On March 20, Chairman Khrushchev indicated Soviet readiness to discuss the proposals.

From March 27 through March 30, Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, and Academician A. A. Blagonravov held preliminary talks in New York. Representatives of the USSR and the US, headed by Blagonravov and Dr. Dryden, respectively, met in Geneva May 29 through June 7 to discuss potential areas of cooperation. On June 8, a joint communique was issued at Geneva which stated that a recommended program was being forwarded to the respective governments.

The three specific projects under this program involved (1) exchange of data from weather satellites and the eventual coordinated launching of such satellites, (2) a joint effort to map the magnetic field of the earth by means of coordinated geomagnetic satellite launchings and ground observations, and (3) cooperation in the experimental relay of communications via the ECHO satellite. It was also agreed that there should be further discussion of the possibility of broader cooperation in experiments using active communications satellites to be launched in the future.

On July 9, Dr. Dryden sent a letter to Blagonravov stating that the United States had no objections to the recommended program. The Department of State confirmed Dr. Dryden's letter on August 29 in a note sent to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. V. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter dated October 21 to NASA Administrator, James E. Webb, stating that Soviet scientists were prepared to begin implementation of the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement.

To date the details of this agreement have not been officially given to the public.

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US-SOVIET BILATERAL AIR AGREEMENT

Soviet interest in signing the initialled Civil Air Agreement with the U.S. was most recently indicated less than two weeks ago when General Schetechikov, First Deputy Chief of Aeroflot raised the question, on his government's instructions, with Mr. Halaby, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency. General Schetechikov indicated that his government might withdraw its own agreement to the draft unless we were ready to proceed.

Background. The agreed text of a Civil Air Transport Agreement between the US and USSR was initialled on August 21, 1961. Negotiations for reciprocal air services between New York and Moscow were undertaken in 1960-1961 with provisions of the 1959 agreement with the Soviet Union on scientific, technical, educational, and cultural exchanges. At the time of initialling, the United States announced that, in view of the international situation, it had decided that the time was not appropriate to sign the Civil Air Transport Agreement.

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In this form, the present bilateral Civil Air Agreement should be signed in its present form only as part of a larger settlement.

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